CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE-IMPRISONMENT OF INDIGENT FOR NONPAYMENT OF FINE DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL-In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 255 (1970).
The law in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as
the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal
bread.
Anatole France'
In the early morning of November 30, 1968, Simeon Munzel
Antazo entered the San Jose Speed Shop, took $320 and some speed
equipment, and then set the shop afire. Antazo, after being notified by
the police that he was wanted in connection with the crime, voluntarily
surrendered and, upon being questioned, admitted to conspiring with
the owner of the store, Stephen Clausman, to burglarize and set fire
to the store so that Clausman might collect on his fire insurance policy.
Clausman was arrested and both men were charged with arson, 2 arson
of insured personal property, 3 and conspiracy to commit these substantive offenses. 4 Antazo pleaded guilty to the arson count and the other
charges were dropped. Clausman was found guilty on all three counts
after Antazo testified against him. At the joint sentencing the judge
stated that he considered both defendants "as standing in the same and
identical shoes before the Court with respect to responsibility for these
matters." 5 Hence, each was given a three year suspended sentence,
each to be released on probation on the condition he pay a fine totaling
1 LE Lys ROUGE, ch. 7, as quoted in State v. Lavelle, 54 N.J. 315, 330, 255 A.2d 223,
231 (1969) (Proctor, J., dissenting).
2 CAL. PENAL CODE § 448a (West 1970):
Any person who willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to
be burned or who aids, counsels or procures the burning of any barn, stable, garage
or other building, whether the property of himself or of another, not a parcel of
a dwelling house; or any shop, storehouse, warehouse, factory, mill or other
building, whether the property of himself or of another; or any church, meetinghouse, courthouse, workhouse, school, jail or other public building or any public
bridge; shall, upon conviction thereof, be sentenced to the penitentiary for not
less than 2 nor more than 20 years.
3 CAL. PENAL CODE § 450a (West 1970):
Any person who willfully and with intent to injure or defraud the insurer
sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned or who aids, counsels or procures the
burning of any goods, wares, merchandise or other chattels or personal property
of any kind, whether the property of himself or of another, which shall at the
time be insured by any person or corporation against loss or damage by fire, shall
upon conviction thereof, be sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than one
nor more than five years.
4 CAL. PENAL CODE § 182 (West 1970).
5 In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 106, 473 P.2d 999, 1001, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255, 257 (1970).
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$3,125 or, in lieu of the fine, spend one day in jail for each $10 of fine.
Clausman paid his fine and was immediately released on probation.
Antazo, unable to pay his fine because of his indigency,6 was remanded
to prison until he worked it off at the prescribed rate.
After serving approximately four months Antazo sought a writ
of habeas corpus, 7 alleging that his imprisonment for nonpayment of
a fine was unconstitutional because it violated the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution. The Supreme Court of California, in a landmark
decision, granted petitioner's writ of habeas corpus and ruled that the
imprisonment of an indigent for failure to pay a fine was a violation
of the equal protection clause.8
Although the Antazo court subscribed to the petitioner's basic contention that the imposed conditions of probation necessarily resulted
in different treatment for the monied defendant and the indigent defendant, the court stated that this in itself was not sufficient to establish
a denial of equal protection since the law allows for differences in treat6 See Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 289 n.7 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring),
quoting from REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUsTICE, at 8-9:

Indigence "must be conceived as a relative concept. An impoverished accused
is not necessarily one totally devoid of means." An accused must be deemed
indigent when "at any state of the proceedings [his] lack of means . . . substantially inhibits or prevents the proper assertion of a [particular] right or a claim
of right." . . . Thus, the fact that a defendant may be able to muster enough
resources, of his own or of a friend or relative, to obtain bail does not in itself
establish his nonindigence for the purpose of purchasing a complete trial
transcript or retaining a lawyer.
7 Petitioner was able to make use of habeas corpus rather than relying on appeal
because California law provides that habeas corpus is available when special circumstances
arise. The existence of a constitutional question is a special circumstance which relieves
a defendant from the rule that habeas corpus cannot serve as a substitute for appeal. 3
Cal. 3d at 107-08, 473 P.2d at 1002-03, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 258-59. Accord, In re Newbern, 53
Cal. 2d 786, 350 P.2d 116, 3 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1960) (petitioner attacked constitutionality of
vagrancy statute); Ex parte Bell, 19 Cal. 2d 488, 122 P.2d 22 (1942) (constitutionality of
ordinance challenged). In both cases there was no need to exhaust all available remedies
by appeal.
8 In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970). Recently, the
United States Supreme Court, in Tate v. Short, 39 U.S.L.W. 4301 (Mar. 2, 1971), also ruled
on the imprisonment of indigents. Tate was imprisoned for failure to pay $425 in traffic
fines and the Court ruled that this was unconstitutional, extending the decision in
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (see notes 57-62 and accompanying text, infra), by
adopting Justice White's concurring opinion in Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508 (1970)
(see note 63 and accompanying text, inIra). The Court, discussing the facts before it, stated:
Since Texas has legislated a "fines only" policy for traffic offenses, that statutory
ceiling cannot, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, limit the punishment to payment of the fine if one is able to pay it, yet convert the fine into a
prison term for an indigent defendant without the means to pay his fine.
39 U.S.L.W. at 4302.
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provided that the result of such treatment is not "invidious

discrimination."
The traditional equal protection test, 10 i.e., whether the statutory
classification is devoid of any rational connection to a declared state
purpose, 1 was not applied to the statutes in question 12 because the
court held that the circumstances warranted the application of the relatively modern "compelling interest" test.'8 This test consists of two separate and distinct standards for determining whether the classification is
unconstitutionally discriminatory: (1) when the classification is based
upon certain "suspect" criteria it must be supported by a "compelling"
interest; 1 4 (2) when any classification affects the exercise of a "fundamental right," regardless of the classification's criteria or basis, the state
must establish a compelling interest to justify the resulting difference
in treatment.' 5 Under both of these standards, once the interest has
9 Id. at 110, 473 P.2d at 1005, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 261. See Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S.
141, 147 (1940):
The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or
opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.
10 The traditional equal protection test is sometimes referred to as the "wholly
irrelevant" test; see, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961):
The [fourteenth amendment] safeguard is offended only if the classification
rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective.
State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power
despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. (emphasis
added).
See also Drueding v. Devlin, 234 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1964), aff'd mem., 380 U.S. 125
(1965).
11 See Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231, 237 (1954) (for a denial of equal
protection the statutory classification must cause "different treatments . . . so disparate,
relative to the difference in classification, as to be wholly arbitrary"); Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) (for a denial of equal protection the statute
must be "without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary").
12 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1205 (West 1970) provides that a judgment imposing a fine may
also direct imprisonment until the fine is paid at a rate of not more than one day for
each five dollars of the fine. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13521 (West 1970) provides for the
imposition of a penalty assessment equal to five dollars for every twenty dollars or fraction
thereof, of every fine imposed by the courts. This penalty assessment may be waived if the
offender has been imprisoned for nonpayment of the fine.
13 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658-62 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting), for a
general discussion of the "compelling interest" test.
14 The operational meaning of "suspect" is, roughly, that a court will invalidate
the classification unless it is shown to be "necessary" in the service of some
"compelling" state interest (rather than merely "rationally related" to some
"permissible" governmental objective).
Michelman, Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83
HARV. L. REV. 7, 20 (1969). Michelman defines compelling as "a requirement that the
infringement of fundamental interests resulting from the classification's use be outweighed
by the claimed state purpose." Id. at 20 n.34. For a general discussion, see Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
15 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 660.
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been established, there is a further requirement that this particular
17
16
classification be "necessary"' to achieve that interest.
The first compelling interest standard evolved from the cases involving racial classifications now regarded as inherently suspect.' 8 The
list of suspect criteria was subsequently expanded by the courts so as to
include religion, 19 political beliefs, 20 and wealth. 21 In each of these
cases the very basis of the classification provoked the court to request
that the state have a necessary compelling interest to justify the resulting difference in treatment.
The second branch of the compelling interest test involves the
complex and nebulous concept of "fundamental rights." Through case
22
law the courts have included under this concept the right to vote,
right of procreation, 23 rights with respect to criminal procedure, 24 right
16 Michelman defines "necessity" as follows:
[A] requirement that the challenged classification be strictly relevant to
whatever purpose is claimed by the state to justify its use, and also that it be the
fairest and least restrictive alternative evidently available for the pursuit of
that purpose ....
Michelman, supra note 14, at 20 n.34.
17 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 637.
Is See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (Virginia's statutory scheme to prevent
marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications held to be a denial
of equal protection); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (classification
based on Japanese ancestry found "suspect," although held acceptable under wartime
conditions).
Some justices have advanced the minority view, commonly designated the doctrine of
the "color-blind" constitution, that the equal protection clause prohibits classifications
based on race under any circumstances; see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. at 13
(Stewart, J., concurring); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
joined by Douglas, J., concurring); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S.
552, 566 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
19 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (disqualification from unemployment
benefits due to appellant's refusal to work on Saturday contrary to her religious beliefs
held to impose unconstitutional burden on free exercise of religion); Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961) (statute requiring closing of business on Sunday not unconstitutional as applied to appellant who due to his religious beliefs cannot work on Saturday).
20 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) (election laws preventing minor parties
from having their names placed on the ballot held unconstitutional).
21 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (Virginia's poll tax
struck down); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right of indigent to free trial transcript
on appeal).
22 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964):
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any
alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.
23 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (compulsory sterilization of habitual
criminals):
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights
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to equal education, 25 right to equal opportunity for employment, 26 right
to marital privacy, 27 right to associate freely and privately, 28 and the
right to travel. 29 All of these cases involved significant encroachments
of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race. . . He is forever deprived of a basic liberty. . . . [S]trict
scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential,
lest unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious discriminations are made against groups
or types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and
equal laws.
24 Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (right of indigent not to be imprisoned
beyond the statutory maximum); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right of
indigent to counsel on appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right of indigent to
free trial transcript on appeal).
25 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (state segregation of public schools
held a denial of equal protection):
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. . . . It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is the principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him
to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of
an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it,
is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
Id. at 493; Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm., 237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass.), vacated
on other grounds, 348 F.2d 261 (lst Cir. 1965) (racial segregation resulting from "neighborhood school" policy held a denial of equal protection despite a finding of no conscious
attempt on the part of school authorities to segregate the races, i.e., de facto segregation
held a denial of equal protection).
26 Purdy v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 579, 456 P.2d 645, 654, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77, 86 (1969):
Any limitation on the opportunity for employment impedes the achievement of
economic security, which is essential for the pursuit of life, liberty and
happiness; courts sustain such limitations only after careful scrutiny.
27 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (statute forbidding use of contraceptives held violative of right to marital privacy).
28 Gibson v. Florida Legis. Invest. Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963) (Court held that
petitioner's contempt conviction for refusing to divulge information contained in membership lists violated rights of association); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (compulsory disclosure of NAACP's membership lists held an unconstitutional interference with
the members' freedom of association):
Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may
prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling.
Id. at 524; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (member of association cannot be
forced to disclose the lists of its membership):
[I]t is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association
pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and state action
which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to
the closest scrutiny.
Id. at 460-61; see Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968):
The State has here failed to show any "compelling interest" which justifies imposing such heavy burdens on the right to vote and to associate.
29 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (residency requirement for reception of
welfare benefits was a denial of equal protection):
Since the classification here touches on the fundamental right of interstate
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upon individual rights and liberties either expressly or impliedly guaranteed by the Constitution and inherent in the form of government
created thereby. When the exercise of any of these fundamental rights
is inhibited by a statutory classification, the resulting personal detriment is always severe; and this severity is perhaps the main reason for
preferential treatment afforded these rights under the compelling interest test. 30
When a statutory classification does impinge upon the exercise
of a fundamental right, it is often difficult to determine exactly under
which compelling interest standard the court is making its decision,
i.e., whether the court is adding to the list of suspect criteria or instead finding that the classification has a detrimental effect upon a
fundamental right. It is for this reason that there is some disagreement
as to whether wealth is in fact a suspect classification.8 1
The Antazo court, relying heavily on Williams v. Illinois,32 found
both a suspect classification and the involvement of a fundamental
right and therefore subjected the statutes in question to the compelling interest test on both grounds. The court concluded that the imprisonment of a convicted indigent for nonpayment of a fine was
ineffectual in coercing payment since neither "the threat [nor] the
actuality of imprisonment can force a man who is without funds, to
movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of
whether it promotes a compelling state interest.
Id. at 638; Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970) (residency requirement to qualify to take state bar exam held a denial of equal protection):
We conclude that Rule VI(6) imposes a burden upon the right to interstate
travel without being necessary to promote a compelling interest and is therefore
unconstitutional.
Id. at 1362. See Note, Residency Requirements and State Bar Examinations, 2 SETON HALL
L. REv. 540 (1971).
30 This view was expressed in Comment, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,
82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1130 (1969).
31 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 660 n.9 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Comment, 82
HAxv. L. REv. 1065, supra note 30, at 1124:
These cases [Harperand Griffin, supra note 21 and accompanying text] also involved
rights of fundamental importance, such as voting [Harper] and criminal procedure
[Griffin]. Thus, a concern over distinctions based on wealth was strongly reinforced
by a desire to protect these important personal interests and it does not appear
that distinctions based on payment are always suspect.
See also Michelman, supra note 14, at 24. Michelman contends that Harper did not hold
classifications based on wealth "suspect," but held that one cannot be denied the
"fundamental right" to vote as a sanction for nonpayment of a tax.
32 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (indigent, guilty of petty theft, was given maximum imprisonment plus a fine which upon default could be worked off at rate of five dollars per
day; held a denial of equal protection to imprison an indigent beyond the statutory
maximum). In Antazo, the defendant did not receive the maximum sentence under CAL.
PENAL CODE § 448a (see note 2 supra).
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pay a fine. ' 3 3 Assuming, arguendo, that imprisonment for default did
serve the state's interest in the collection of fines, the court reasoned
that it was not necessary in the constitutional sense, since there existed
alternative and less intrusive methods of obtaining payment of fines
34
from convicted indigents.
The court also concluded that immediate imprisonment for default was not a necessary practice to further the state's interest in punishing, rehabilitating and reforming indigent offenders, since the very
nature of a sentence or condition of probation providing alternatively
for fine or imprisonment illustrates the trial judge's prior determination that payment of a fine is sufficient to achieve the state's interest
in this regard.3 5
The Antazo court, for these reasons, concluded that automatic
incarceration of a convicted indigent for his involuntary refusal to
pay a fine, whether embodied in a probation order or a sentence,
violated the indigent's right to equal protection of the law since there
is no necessity for such a practice to achieve any compelling state interest, i.e., there is no justification for denying an indigent the same
36
opportunity as that of a monied offender to pay his fine and go free.
The first case to apply the equal protection rationale to the
condition of indigency was Griflin v. Illinois, in which the United
States Supreme Court held that the failure to provide an indigent
with a free trial transcript on appeal constituted a denial of equal protection.3 7 Justice Black there pronounced that "[t]here can be no equal
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of
money he has."3 8 This equal protection rationale departed from the
3 Cal. 3d at 114, 473 P.2d at 1007, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
Id. For a discussion of alternate means of obtaining payment see notes 65-86 infra
and accompanying text. See also Comment, Fines, Imprisonment, and the Poor: "Thirty
Dollars or Thirty Days," 57 CALIF. L. REV. 778, 810-19 (1969); Comment, Equal Protection
and the Use of Fines as Penalties for Criminal Offenses, 1966 ILL. L.F. 460, 463-66;
Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Imprisonment of the Indigent for Nonpayment of
Fines, 64 Micis. L. REV. 938, 945-47 (1966).
35 3 Cal. 3d at 115, 473 P.2d at 1009, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
86 Id. at 115-16, 473 P.2d at 1009, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 265. The court, in holding that
§ 1205 of the CAL. PENAL CODE denied the indigent petitioner equal protection, apparently
ignored the distinction between a judgment and a probation order; see Ex parte McVeity,
98 Cal. App. 723, 727, 277 P. 745, 746 (Dist. Ct. App. 1929) (a fine as a condition of
probation is not a judgment imposing a fine within the meaning of § 1205).
37 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956).
38 Id. at 19; see Wildeblood v. United States, 284 F.2d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1960), where
Judge Edgerton, dissenting, paraphrases Justice Black, applying his reasoning to default
imprisonment of the indigent:
Few would care to say there can be equal justice where the kind of punishment
a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.
ld. at 594.
33
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traditional "state action ' 3 9 approach and, in effect, imposed upon the
state the obligation to take affirmative action to obviate societal handicaps, e.g., "class structures, distribution of wealth, and group prejudices," 40 for which the state is not directly responsible, "whenever
they operate to prevent equal access to basic, minimal advantages
enjoyed by other citizens. ' ' 41 Under this approach, the Griffin Court
found "wealth" to be a suspect classification which prevented equality
of opportunity within the system of criminal procedure, and even
using the traditional equal protection test found no rational basis
for such a classification. 42 The Griffin rationale has been utilized by
later courts to ensure equality within other areas of criminal procedure.

43

39 For cases holding that there is no denial of equal protection unless the discrimination is the result of state action, see Bell v. School City, 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), afl'd,
324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964); Vick v. County Bd. of Educ.,
205 F. Supp. 436 (W.D. Tenn. 1962); Brown v. Board of Educ., 139 F. Supp. 468 (D. Kan.
1955).
40 Comment, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, supra note 30, at 1189.
41 Id. See also Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm., 237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass.),
vacated on other grounds, 348 F.2d 261 (lst Cir. 1965), where the court stated:
It is neither just nor sensible to proscribe segregation having its basis in affirmative state action while at the same time failing to provide a remedy for
segregation which grows out of discrimination in housing, or other economic or
social factors. Education is tax supported and compulsory, and public school
educators, therefore, must deal with inadequacies within the educational
system as they arise, and it matters not that the inadequacies are not of their
making.
Id. at 546; Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 508 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nor. Smuck
v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (court ordered the school board to take affirmative
steps to correct the racial imbalance in the schools despite the fact that the segregation
was not directly attributable to the school's policies).
42 The Griffin Court stated:
In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty than
on account of religion, race, or color. Plainly the ability to pay costs in advance
bears no rational relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence ....
351 U.S. at 17-18. Justice Harlan, dissenting, argued that the requirement of payment of
a fee could not be considered a suspect classification because it would require the states to
equalize the economic positions of rich and poor. Id. at 35-36. Justice White echoed Justice
Harlan's opinion in Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 509 (1963) (White, J., dissenting).
43 Mempa v. Rhay, 889 U.S. 128, 137 (1967) ("a lawyer must be afforded at this
proceeding whether it be labeled a revocation of probation or a deferred sentencing');
Roberts v. LaVallee, 889 U.S. 40, 42 (1967) (fee for preliminary hearing transcript held a
denial of equal protection); Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748 (1967) (supplying of indigent
with mere "clerk's transcript" held a denial of equal protection); Anders v. California, 586
U.S. 738, 745 (1967) (provision of counsel upon initial review "would merely afford . . .
that advocacy which a nonindigent defendant is able to obtain.'); Long v. District Court,
385 U.S. 192 (1966) (right to free transcript on habeas corpus proceedings); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 472 (1966) (indigent has right to counsel prior to police interroga.
tion); Draper v. Washington, 872 U.S. 487 (1963) (trial judge cannot determine merits of
indigent's appeal); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (public defender may not decide
merits of indigent's appeal); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963) (merits of
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The court in United States ex rel. Privitera v. Kross 44 refused to

extend the Griffin rationale to the prohibition of the automatic incarceration of convicted indigents for nonpayment of a fine when the
resulting imprisonment is less than the maximum statutory period
of confinement for the commission of the substantive offense.4 5 Privitera, contrary to the traditional view, 46 construed default imprison-

ment to be part of the punishment for the crime committed, 47 and
evaded the equal protection issue by attributing the discriminatory
48
results of such a practice to the trial judge's sentencing discretion.
indigent's appeal cannot be determined without counsel); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 339 (1963) (statute appointing counsel for indigents in capital cases only held
unconstitutional); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 714 (1961) (filing fee cannot be employed
to deny an indigent writ of habeas corpus); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (filing fee
unconstitutional if it prohibits indigent from exercising right of appeal); Ellis v. United
States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958) (indigent is entitled to have his counsel functioning actively on
his behalf and not merely as amicus curiae); Greenwell v. United States, 317 F.2d 108, 110
(D.C. Cir. 1963) (indigent's request for subpoenas need not be substantiated by production of
testimonial or documentary evidence). But see Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420, 423 (1963)
(if no transcript is available and indigent's trial lawyer is continuing on his case there
is no absolute right to a trial transcript); United States ex rel. Marshall v. Wilkins, 338
F.2d 404, 406 (2d Cir. 1964) (since habeas corpus is civil in nature there is no absolute right
to appointment of counsel); Pilkington v. Circuit Court, 324 F.2d 45, 46 (8th Cir. 1963)
("mere fact that an accused is unable to furnish [bail] in any sum . . . does not present a
federal question").
44 239 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 345 F.2d 533 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 911
(1965) (indigent was convicted of illegal possession of lottery slips under statute allowing
maximum sentence of one year plus $500 fine; sentence imposed was 30 days and $500
fine, upon default of which an additional sixty days was added).
45 239 F. Supp. at 120.
46 The traditional view is that default imprisonment is used solely as a device to
coerce payment of a fine. See generally 21 AM. JUR. 2d Criminal Law § 603 (1965); 36A
C.J.S. Fines § 11 (1961).
47 See Note, 64 MscH. L. REv. 938, supra note 34, at 943:
[T]he Privitera court erred in placing imprisonment for nonpayment of a fine
on a parity with incarceration for the substantive offense.
48 239 F. Supp. at 120. The court stated:
[S]entences are individualized, [and] it serves no useful purpose to compare the
sentence of this [indigent] defendant with that of another, hypothetical [wealthy]
defendant.
Privitera'sargument has been the object of some criticism. See Note, 64 MiCH. L. REV. 938,
supra note 34:
This analysis would seem to skirt the issue by failing to recognize that imprisonment for nonpayment of fines has always been justified only as a coercive device,
never as a punishment. The judge's discretion as to the use of defendant's past
criminal record is relevant only when the sanction for the substantive crime is
being imposed. At that time the record may influence the decision whether to
impose a fine, imprisonment, or both. However, these considerations have no
applicability as a justification for imprisonment for nonpayment once the
appropriate sanction is determined. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 942-43; Comment, 57 CAF. L. REv. 778, supra note 34, at 801; Greenawalt, Constitutional Law, 18 SYRACUSE L. REv. 180, 196-97 (1966); Note, 4 HousToN L. lEv. 695, 700
(1967).
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The Priviteracourt indicated, however, that if the imprisonment exceeded the statutory maximum there might be a denial of equal protection. 49 The Privitera holding was upheld by subsequent federal
decisions in Kelly v. Schoonfield ° and Morris v. Schoonfield.51 These
three decisions turn on the fact that the courts construed default imprisonment to be validly applied to indigents if its purpose is substituted punishment.
A year after Privitera,the New York Court of Appeals in People
v. Saffore held exactly what Privitera had hinted at, namely, that
imprisonment of an indigent for nonpayment of a fine was a denial
of equal protection if it forced the indigent offender to be imprisoned
beyond the statutory maximum. 52 However, Saflore rejected Privitera's
53
interpretation of default imprisonment as substituted punishment,
concluding:
Since imprisonment for nonpayment of a fine can validly be used
only as a method of collection for refusal to pay a fine we should
now hold that it is illegal
so to imprison a defendant who is
54
financially unable to pay.

This reasoning would appear to support the position that automatic
default imprisonment is a denial of equal protection regardless of the
length of the indigent's confinement, but the court declined to so hold.
49 239 F. Supp. at 121:
[T]he issues raised [equal protection and excessive fines] by petitioner would
be more starkly presented in Federal constitutional terms had he been sentenced
• . . to the maximum permissible jail term and fined $500, default to result in
additional imprisonment ....
50 285 F. Supp. 732 (D. Md. 1968) (class action testing constitutionality of default
imprisonment resulting in confinement for less than the statutory maximum). The court
held that the classification was valid to promote the state's interest in seeing
that persons who are found guilty of breaking the laws shall receive some appropriate punishment, to impress on the offender the importance of observing the
law, in the hope of reforming him, and to deter the offender and other potential
offenders from committing such offenses in the future.
Id. at 737.
51 301 F. Supp. 158 (D. Md. 1969), vacated as moot, 399 U.S. 508 (1970) (practice of
imprisoning indigents for default of fines when the result is less than the statutory
maximum). The court held that the indigent could be imprisoned for default if such
imprisonment is substituted punishment, but qualified its holding by stating:
The use of compulsion to pay a fine in the case of a non-indigent defendant is
constitutionally permissible, but the imposition of such compulsion on an indigent
defendant might well violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id. at 163.
52 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1966) (indigent found guilty of
assault and given maximum sentence of one year plus $500 fine; default imprisonment
held a denial of equal protection).
53 Id. at 104, 218 N.E.2d at 687, 271 N.YS.2d at 974.
54 Id.
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Subsequent state court decisions have found a denial of equal protection only when, as in Safore, the resulting confinement exceeds the
statutory maximum,55 although a few decisions have upheld the constitutionality of imprisonment of indigents beyond the statutory maximum.5 6
The Privitera-Safore reasoning was embraced by the United
States Supreme Court in the recent case of Williams v. Illinois.5 7 In
this case, which involved an indigent who had received the maximum
prison term plus a fine, the Court limited itself to the Safore holding:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that the statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment for
any substantive offense be
the same for all defendants irrespective
58
of their economic status.
The Hobson's choice condemned by the Williams Court was not the
indigent's choice of paying his fine and avoiding default imprisonment
but rather his choice of limiting his confinement to the statutory maximum by paying his fine. 59 Justice Harlan, concurring in this result,
criticized the Court for deciding the case on the equal protection
basis 60 and stated:
[W]hen a State declares its penal interest may be satisfied by a fine
or a forfeiture in combination with a jail term the administrative
inconvenience in a judgment collection procedure does not, as a
matter of due process, justify sending to jail or extending the jail
term of individuals who possess no accumulated assets. 61
Although Harlan chose to view the resulting injustice as a denial of
due process, he expressed an understanding of the fundamental issue
involved in such a practice and chided the majority for limiting its
55 See, e.g., State v. Allen, 104 N.J. Super.
187, 249 A.2d 70 (App. Div.), afj'd
on other grounds, 54 N.J. 311, 255 A.2d 221 (1969) (less than maximum sentence; court
remarked that Saflore and other decisions have held such imprisonment invalid only
when it exceeded the statutory maximum); People v. Tennyson, 19 N.Y.2d 573, 227
N.E.2d 876, 281 N.Y.S.2d 76 (1967); People v. Mackey, 18 N.Y.2d 755, 221 N.E.2d 462,
274 N.Y.S.2d 682 (1966).
56 See People v. Williams, 41 Ill. 2d 511, 244 N.E.2d 197 (1969), rev'd, 399 U.S. 235
(1970) (indigent forced through default imprisonment to be imprisoned beyond the
statutory maximum; held not a denial of equal protection); Wade v. Carsley, 221 So.
2d 725 (Miss. 1969) (indigent forced by default to be imprisoned beyond the maximum;
held valid). The Wade court stated that the "fine was imposed not because appellant
was indigent, but because she violated the law." Id. at 726.
57 399 U.S. 235 (1970).

58

Id. at 244.

59 Id. at 242.
00 Id. at 260.
61

Id. at 265.
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holding to situations in which the indigent offender received the
statutory maximum period of confinement:
[U]nlike the Court, I see no distinction between circumstances
where the State through its judicial agent determines that effective
punishment requires less than the maximum prison term plus a
62
fine, or a fine alone, and the circumstances of this case.
Soon after the Williams decision, Supreme Court Justices White,
Douglas, Brennan and Marshall, in a concurring opinion, addressed
themselves to the fundamental equal protection issue involved in the
perfunctory imprisonment of an indigent offender for his inability to
make an immediate lump sum payment of his fine:
[T]he same constitutional defect condemned in Williams also inheres in jailing an indigent for failing to make immediate payment
of any fine, whether or not the fine is accompanied by a jail term
and whether or not the jail term of the indigent extends beyond the
maximum term that may be imposed on a person willing and able
to pay a fine. In each case, the Constitution prohibits the State
from imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically converting it into a jail term solely because 63the defendant is indigent and
cannot forthwith pay the fine in full.
It is unfortunate that this articulate analysis of the equal protection
issue took the form of dicta.
The California Supreme Court did not wait for the United States
Supreme Court to reach this determination. Antazo is the first case,
state or federal, to hold that it is a denial of equal protection to automatically imprison an indigent offender for his inability to make
immediate payment of a fine, whether imposed as part of a probation
order or a sentence, regardless of the length of the resulting confinement. Distinguishing between a refusal to pay a fine and the inability to do so, the court concluded that the fundamental equal
protection argument was not the indigent's inability to limit his confinement to the statutory maximum, but his inability to make a choice
64
when faced with an alternative sentence of fine or imprisonment.
Under this rationale the length of the indigent's imprisonment is irId. at 265 n.
Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 509 (1970).
64 Justice Goldberg concurs in this analysis. See Goldberg, Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 205, 221 (1964):
The "choice" of paying $100 fine or spending 30 days in jail is really no
choice at all to the person who cannot raise $100. The resulting imprisonment
is no more or no less than imprisonment for being poor, a doctrine which I trust
this Nation has long since outgrown,
62
63
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relevant, since it is the legality of the, imprisonment itself which is
constitutionally defective.
ALTERNATIVES TO DEFAULT IMPRISONMENT

The use of fines as a criminal sanction has been the subject of
some criticism. The sanction in fact frequently "has little to do with
his culpability or with the affirmative. accomplishment of any penological objectives."66 Moreover, despite its frequent use as an alternative to punishment, "it frequently happens that the result is the
very jail sentence which is sought to be avoided."6 6 However, regardless of its deficiencies, the complete elimination of the fine from
the administration of criminal justice is not the solution because: (1)
there are instances when the offense and the offender's past record do
not justify the harshness of imprisonment although requiring some
penal sanction; (2) total reliance on imprisonment as a penal
sanction would impose an unequal burden on the employed monied
offender, as opposed to the burden such confinement would impose on
an unemployed indigent; and (3) fines have become an important
67
source of revenue for local government.
There are two possible approaches to the problem of default imprisonment: the development of other more flexible methods of obtaining payment, and the requirement that fines be imposed only on
those able to pay.
The most ideal method of obtaining payment of a fine from a
defendant unable to make an immediate lump sum payment is an
installment fine system. Many states already provide by statute for such
a system,68 as does the Model Penal Code.69 Under this system the
65 ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES, Commentary § 2.7(a), at 119 (Tentative Draft 1967).
66 Id., Commentary § 2.7(b), at 119.

67 Note, 64 MICH. L. REV. 938, supra note 34, at 946; Note, 101 U. PA. L. REV.
1013, 1026 (1953) (these authorities defend the utilization of fines in the administration
of criminal justice). But see ABA, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES, supra note
65, at § 2.7(c)(IV), (in pertinent part): "Revenue production is not a legitimate basis for
imposing a fine."
68 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1205 (West 1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 38, § 4 (1970 Cum.
Supp.); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 1 (1968); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 769.3 (1948); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:166-15 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 953-56 (1964); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 55-593 (1952); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 470-d(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
69 MODEL PENAL CODE § 302.1(1) (P.O.D. 1962):
When a defendant is sentenced to pay a fine, the Court may grant permission for
the payment to be made within a specified period of time or in specified installments. If no such permission is embodied in the sentence, the fine shall be payable forthwith.
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courts would be required to offer this method of payment immediately
upon a showing of indigency. The installment system has many
advantages over the present usage of default imprisonment:
70
(1) It avoids the following evils of short-term imprisonment:
(a) The confinement is so brief as to prohibit any effectual
rehabilitative measures.
(b) The institutions are often crowded and unsanitary.
(c) Since "there is little or no attempt to segregate types of
offenders, . . . [there results] associations which may promote
future crime rather than deter it."71
(d) The offender's absence may have an adverse effect upon
his family's economic status, morale and community reputation.
(e) The rate of recidivism may be increased by the offender's
T2
inability to readjust to the community after his release.
(2) It leads to a collection of more fines.
73
(3) It decreases the mounting cost of prison maintenance.
(4) It reduces recidivism by keeping the offender cognizant of
74
his guilt for a longer period of time.
If the indigent offender should achieve the ability to pay and then
refuses, he may at that time be validly imprisoned for his default. 75
Similar to the installment system are the "criminal credit administration" and the "delayed payment system." The criminal credit
administration would be established by the state for the purpose of
70 For a general discussion of the evils of short-term imprisonment, see Note,
Imprisonment for Nonpayment of Fines and Costs: A New Look at the Law and the
Constitution, 22 VAND. L. REV. 611 (1969); Note. 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1013, supra note 67,
at 1022.
71 ABA, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 65, Commentary §
2.7(b), at 120.
72 Note, 22 VAND. L. REV. 611, supra note 70, at 620 n.48.

73 A Tennessee study has shown that the per capita cost of prison maintenance
and the revenue extracted from prison labor resulted in a net loss of more than half
a million dollars. Comment, Jail Fees and Court Costs for the Indigent Criminal Defendant: An Examination of the Tennessee Procedure, 35 TENN. L. REV. 74, 89 (1967).
74 On advantages of the installment system generally, see Note, 22 VAND. L. REV.
611, supra note 70, at 625; Note, 64 MIcH L. REV. 938, supra note 34, at 946.
75 PRESIDENT'S

COMMISSION

ON

LAW

ENFORCEMENT

AND

ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE,

TASK FORCE REPORT: THE CouRTs 18 (1967):

[A] defendant may not be imprisoned unless his default is due to a willful
refusal to pay or to make a good faith effort to obtain the money.
ABA, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 65, states:
The effect of nonpayment of a fine should be determined after the fine has not
been paid and after examination of the reasons for nonpayment.
Id. at § 2.7(e).
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lending the indigent offender the funds to pay his fine. Many states
already provide for a delayed payment system; 7 7 under this system the

court would be empowered to set some future date by which the fine
must be paid rather than demand immediate payment. Some states
also provide a civil remedy of execution against defendant's property. 78
It is also possible to transfer the harshness of a fine into a conditional
probation devoid of any financial obligations by extending the length
of the probationary period, imposing a curfew, and requiring weekly
reports to his probation officer; analogous is the system of "custodial
release" which would authorize the court to assign an unemployable
indigent offender to the custody of welfare and social authorities.
This custodial release would not only offer the possibility of enabling the indigent ultimately to satisfy his pecuniary obligation
to the state, but would also offer significant opportunities for rehabilitation.7 9
If confinement is necessary, some of the disadvantages of the present
default imprisonment system could be avoided by a weekend imprisonment which would hopefully induce the offender to obtain a job
rather than suffer this periodic incarceration. Similar to the previous
system is the "work release" program, effective in more than one-third
of the states,80 under which certain prisoners, with proper qualifications,
could be released to the community to pursue some employment.
The courts could easily determine the impact of a particular
penal sanction through the utilization of a presentence report. In some
states the court is required to make such a report,8' but usually its use
78 Note, Equal Protection and the Indigent Defendant: Griffin and Its Progeny, 16
STAN. L. REv. 394, 412-13 (1964).
77 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (West 1970); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
1968); MD. ANN. CODE art. 38, § 4 (Supp. 1970); MAss. LAWS ANN. ch. 279,
N.Y. CODE CRIm. PROC. § 470-d (McKinney Supp. 1970); PA. STAT. ANN.
(1964); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.82.020 (1959).
78 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1206 (West 1970); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,

§ 4332(c) (Supp.
§§ 1-lA (1968);
tit. 19, § 1082

§ 180-4 (SmithHurd 1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:166-11 (1953); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 470-d (McKinney
Supp. 1970); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2949.09 (Baldwin 1964).
79 Note, 64 MicH. L. REV. 938, supra note 34, at 946.
80 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1208 (West 1970); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 6532-34 (Supp.
1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 945.091(l)(b) (Supp. 1971); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 527 (Supp.
1970); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1747(1) (Supp. 1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 241.26 (Supp. 1971);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 221.170 (1959); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-2216 (Special Supp. 1968);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607:14-a (Supp. 1970); N.Y. CoREac. LAW §§ 150-60 (McKinney
1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-33.1 (Supp. 1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-1237 (Supp. 1970);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 207 (rep]. 1970); Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 303.9 (P.O.D. 1962).
81 E.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-2203 (Special Supp. 1968); N.J.R. 3:21-2 (1969);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-19-6 (1969).

NOTES

is left to the court's discretion. s2 If the court determines that a particular defendant is unable to pay a fine, then the court can directly impose a short-term confinement. This practice of fining only those who
can pay was accepted by the American Bar Association Project on
Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice8 3 and incorporated into the
Model Penal Code.8 4 This position was also endorsed by the President's
Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia:
The Commission believes that making imprisonment dependent
on an offender's financial status is wrong. If a fine is to be imposed,
it should be set in light of the offender's ability to pay and this information should specifically appear in the presentence report. If
the offender cannot pay a fine all at once, periodic installment payments should be established. If it appears that he will not be able
to pay a fine under any circumstances, the court should impose a
sentence of either imprisonment or probation, whichever is appropriate in the case, and not offer an offender a false option unrelated to his character or his offense. 8 5
Of the two alternatives to the problem of default imprisonment,
the collection approach is the more preferable, since the other would
frequently result in the indigent's direct imprisonment. Although
such imprisonment would no doubt be shorter than that imposed
under the existing default procedures, it nonetheless remains imprisonment when a fine would have been sufficient. If for some reason an indigent is unable to pay under any of the alternative collection methods
and probational or custodial release is unavailable, imprisonment based
upon the indigent's own peculiar circumstances must necessarily be imposed. This imprisonment will at least be more equitable than imprisonment under some arbitrary rate.8 6
82 E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-17-23 (1964); VA. CODE ANN. § 53-278.1 (1967 repl.)
83 ABA, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 65, at § 2.7(c) (in part):

In determining whether to impose a fine and its amount, the court should
consider:

(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of a
fine will impose, with due regard to his other obligations;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay a fine on an installment basis or on
other conditions to be fixed by the court ....
See also ABA, PROBATION § 3.2(d) (Tentative Draft 1967):
Conditions requiring payment of fines, restitution, reparation, or family
support should not go beyond the probationer's ability to pay.
84 MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.02(3)(a) (P.O.D. 1962):
The Court shall not sentence a defendant to pay a fine unless: (a) the defendant
is or will be able to pay the fine ....
85 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBLA

394 (1966).
86 The per diem rates vary from state to state; see, e.g., CAL.

PENAL CODE §
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THE NEW JERSEY APPROACH

Imprisonment for nonpayment of a fine has long been an accepted
practice in New Jersey. In 1822 a juror was held in contempt of court
and fined; the supreme court ruled that it was proper that the juror
"be committed till the fine is paid." sT Such imprisonment has been
justified by applying the common law reasoning that it is not part of
the punishment but rather only a method to coerce payment of the
fine. In Dodge v. State,s8 in 1854, the defendant was sent to jail for
nonpayment of costs, and the supreme court, after ruling that costs
were on the same footing as a fine, stated:
[D]irecting that the prisoner shall stand committed till the fine,
or till the fine and costs are paid, is not adding to the legal punishment, but simply a mode of enforcing obedience to the sentence of
the law. The usual form of common law judgment is, that the
prisoner stand committed till the fine is paid.
The order that the defendant stand committed till the fine
and costs are paid, does not .

.

. add anything to the punishment

inflicted by law, or in any wise affect the rights of the defendant ....

89

Under the early common law, the length of time a defendant
who failed to pay his fine had to spend in jail was indefinite, but later
statutes limited it or set up a correlation between the length of the
jail term and the amount of the fine.90 In 1851, New Jersey passed a
law that a defendant unable to pay his fine should be confined to prison
to do labor until the fine was paid by "such labor, or otherwise." 9' 1 This
statute followed the common law approach that the defendant should
be sent to jail until his fine was paid, the only modification being that
the defendant could pay off his fine while in jail. Once again the imprisonment itself was not part of the punishment, but only a method
of compelling the defendant to pay his fine. A similar act was passed
(West 1970) (five dollars); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-2302(b) (1969) (ten dollars); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 29-2412 (1965) (six dollars); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:166-16 (Supp. 1970) (five
dollars); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2947.14 (1954) (three dollars); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15
(1953) (two dollars); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-4-10 (1966) (one dollar and fifty cents).
87 Crane v. Sayre, 6 N.J.L. 110, 111 (Sup. Ct. 1822).
88 24 N.J.L. 455 (Sup. Ct. 1854).
89 Id. at 466-67.
90 See generally 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENCLISH LAW 516-18
(2d ed. 1968); Seagle, Fines, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCEs 250 (1931); Comment,
57 CALIF. L. REV. 778, supra note 34.
91 Law of March 18, 1851, ch. 237, § 90, N.J. Laws 348.
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in 1898, which provided that a defendant be placed at labor until his
fine is paid by the proceeds of his labor. 2
This statute refers to a fine meted out in any court in the state,
and applies whether the defendant is placed in a county jail or a penitentiary. The legislature, however, by laws in 189593 and 189894 limited
to ninety days the amount of time a defendant could spend in jail for
nonpayment of a fine imposed by a city court and a county court, respectively. But the legislature was not deviating from the common law
concept of imprisonment for nonpayment of a fine. The ninety day
limitation did not make the jail term an alternate punishment for
the substantive offense; rather, it simply added a practical limitation.
In 1950, the New Jersey Legislature passed a statute which provided that any person incarcerated for nonpayment of a fine would be
given a credit of $3 toward his fine for each day in prison. This was
amended in 1963 to raise the credit to $5 per day.95 The legislature
was apparently substituting the alternate punishment rationale by
providing an equivalent time in jail for a specific amount of fine. The
potential prisoner is now faced with a choice of paying X amount of
dollars or going to jail for Y amount of time, with the imprisonment
a substitute punishment for the mulct. Of course, by retaining the
threat of imprisonment for nonpayment, the statute also provides a
coercive pressure upon the defendant.
In spite of the legislative change, the courts have chosen to retain
the common law rationale. In 1954, the appellate division of the
Law of June 14, 1898, ch. 237, § 90, N.J. Laws 899:
When on any indictment, judgment shall be given in any of the courts of
this state for fine or imprisonment and costs, or fine without costs, or costs without
fine or imprisonment, it shall be lawful to place the defendant against whom
such judgment shall be rendered at labor in any county jail or county penitentiary, until such fine and costs, or fine or costs, are paid by the proceeds of such
labor or otherwise.
This law is now codified as N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:166-14 (1953).
93 Law of February 26, 1895, ch. 52, § 1, N.J. Laws 118-19.
94 Law of June 13, 1898, ch. 208, § 1, N.J. Laws 481-82.
95 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:166-16 (Supp. 1970) states:
Whenever it shall appear that a person is confined in a State penal or correctional institution by reason of default in the payment of fines and costs of
prosecution and wherein the committing court, as part of the sentence of
imprisonment, ordered that the prisoner stand committed until such fine and costs
are paid, such prisoner shall be given credit against the amount of such fines and
costs at the rate of $5.00 for each day of confinement. When the prisoner
shall have been confined for a sufficient number of days to establish credits
equal to the total aggregate amount of such fines and costs, and is not held by
reason of any other sentence or commitment, he shall be discharged from imprisonment by the chief executive officer of the State penal or correctional institution wherein he is so confined.
92
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superior court was presented with the question of whether Ronald
Johnson would be able to credit thirty days pretrial detention toward
his sentence of thirty days in jail for failure to pay a $200 fine. 96 If the
thirty day imprisonment for nonpayment was an alternate punishment, then Johnson could get credit for the thirty days he had already
spent in jail; on the other hand, if the thirty day sentence for nonpayment was coercive and not part of the punishment, then Johnson
would not be entitled to the credit. The court, in accordance with the
common law, ruled against Johnson, holding that the thirty day jail
term must be considered as a penalty for not paying the fine; the
97
custody of the defendant is only a method of enforcing the fine.
State v. Johnson was quoted with approval in State v. Allen, 98
where the propriety of imprisoning an indigent for nonpayment of a
fine was questioned. Here the court ruled that such imprisonment was
constitutional as long as the amount of time the defendant spent in
jail did not exceed the maximum sentence the statute prescribed. 99
The majority did not ascribe any importance to the reasoning behind
the fine but instead based their decision on the fact that imprisonment
for nonpayment had a long history in the law. Judge Conford, however,
in his dissent attacking the custom, stated:
[S]ubjection of an indigent to incarceration as a purported sanction for failure to pay a fine is unconstitutional both as a denial
of equal protection of the laws and a deprivation of liberty without substantive due process. 100
The question of imprisonment of an indigent for failure to pay
a fine was brought before the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v.
Lavelle.10 1 Lavelle had been convicted for possession of marihuana
96 State v. Johnson, 30 N.J. Super. 235, 237, 104 A.2d 87, 88 (App. Div. 1954).
Id.
98 104 N.J. Super. 187, 249 A.2d 70 (App. Div.), aff'd on other grounds, 54 N.J. 311,
255 A.2d 221 (1969).
99 The court relied on the reasoning of People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d
686, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1966), and United States ex rel. Privitera v. Kross, 239 F. Supp.
118 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 345 F.2d 533 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 911 (1965). See notes
44-56 supra, and accompanying text.
100 104 N.J. Super. at 197, 249 A.2d at 75 (emphasis added). Apparently what Judge
Conford meant when he said that the imprisonment would be a loss of liberty without
substantive due process is that, since the imprisonment for failure to pay a fine is not,
according to New Jersey law, an alternate punishment, the imprisonment is a punishment
for failure to pay the fine. Therefore the incarceration is a separate punishment not issuing out of the conviction for the substantive offense and therefore one which the
defendant never had a chance to defend himself against; hence he loses his liberty without
an opportunity to be heard on the matter.
101 54 N.J. 315, 255 A.2d 223 (1969). Also decided on the same day was State v. Allen,
97
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and given a suspended sentence and a $250 fine which was to be satisfied at $5 per week. During the ensuing year Lavelle paid only $25 of
his fine and was again arrested. As a result, the trial judge vacated his
original sentence and ordered Lavelle to jail for three to five years and
imposed a $1,000 fine, with the provision that Lavelle remain in jail
until the fine was paid. After spending some time in jail Lavelle was
granted parole. However, he was not to be granted street parole
until he worked off his fine at $5 a day in jail. He appealed his cell
parole on the ground that he was being imprisoned as a result of his
poverty.
Justice Francis, speaking for the majority, stated:
Under all the circumstances revealed by the record it cannot
be said that Lavelle was denied street parole solely because of his
indigency. Courts must give great weight to the expertise of the

Board in dealing with parole decisions. They should not intervene unless it clearly and convincingly appears that the Board
abused its discretion. No such showing has been made here. Accordingly, we see no problem of constitutional dimension in the
case .... 102

Justice Proctor, in a dissent in which he was joined by justices
Jacobs and Schettino, felt that the defendant's constitutional rights
had been violated because he was given a cell parole while another
more affluent defendant would have been given street parole. He
stated:
It was solely Lavelle's lack of funds that was keeping him in
prison ....

A prisoner, rich or poor, who has been found fit to

return to society under conditions of parole should be given an opportunity to pay his fine in installments while he is at liberty105
Through this dissent, the three New Jersey Supreme Court Justices
put themselves in line with the Antazo decision, and it is hoped that
perhaps soon the rest of the court will adopt this reasoning.
CONCLUSION

In light of the abundant and varied alternatives to immediate
incarceration for nonpayment of a fine, and in view of the strong
constitutional challenges which have been marshalled against the
practice, the Antazo decision presents a solution which is both just and
54 N.J. 311, 255 A.2d 221 (1969), which was affirmed on grounds other than which the
appellate division had decided it.
102 54 N.J. at 325, 255 A.2d at 228.
103 Id. at 329-30, 255 A.2d at 231.

524

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

practical. The state must present alternative methods of payment for
indigent defendants, but should those persons afforded such an opportunity not carry out the conditions imposed on them, then they
may be jailed to work off their fine. Such a solution does not trample
on the fundamental rights of the poor for administrative convenience,
nor, on the other hand, does it allow indigent defendants to avoid punishment altogether; rather, the Antazo rationale provides a good
balance, and it is a decision that should be followed by other courts.
Richard P. Cushing
John F. Neary

